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Logical Positivism and Carnap’s Confirmability  
on the Meaningfulness of Religious Language
Alberto Oya
The characteristic claim of the group of thinkers who referred to them-
selves as “The Vienna Circle” and who formed the philosophical movement 
now known as “Logical Positivism” was their acceptance of the so-called 
verifiability principle. Put briefly, the verifiability principle is an empiricist 
criterion of meaning which says that only those statements that are verifi-
able by (i.e., logically deducible from) observational statements are cogni-
tively meaningful.1 Statements that do not satisfy the verifiability principle 
were taken to be cognitively meaningless, statements that failed to describe 
any state of affairs.2 
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1  The verifiability principle is neutral regarding the status of observational statements 
(the so-called ‘protocol statements’). Some logical positivists took protocol statements to 
be the starting-points and paradigm cases of the rest of meaningful statements (see, for 
example: M. Schlick (1934). “The Foundation of Knowledge”, 213 and 221 [reprint-
ed in: A. J. Ayer (ed.) (1959). Logical Positivism. New York: The Free Press, 209-227). 
However, not all logical positivists who accepted the verifiability principle also accepted 
this alleged foundational nature of protocol statements. Neurath, for example, defended 
a coherentist view of truth according to which no statements are more basic or funda-
mental than others: all statements are of equal value and hence no set of statements can 
provide the foundations of our knowledge (see: O. Neurath (1932). “Protocol State-
ments”, 94-95 [reprinted in: O. Neurath (1983). Philosophical Papers, 1913-1946. 
Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 91-99]). 
2  Classic formulations of the verifiability principle can be found in, for example: A. J 
Ayer (1934). “Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics”, Mind 43/171, 337; 
R Carnap (1928). “Pseudoproblems in Philosophy”, 325-327 [reprinted in: R Carnap 
(1967). The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. California: 
Open Court, 305-340]; A. E. Blumberg and H Feigl (1931). “Logical Positivism: A 
Espíritu LXVII (2018) ∙ n.º 155 ∙ 243-249
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It is important to distinguish between the classical, Viennese formulation 
of the verifiability principle and its liberalized versions, which include Car-
nap’s confirmability. Whereas the first takes verifiability to be a matter of logi-
cal deduction from observational statements, the latter makes inductive infer-
ence from observational statements the requirement for cognitive meaning. 
If we are to accept the verifiability principle in its classical Viennese 
formulation, which states that verifiability is a matter of logical deduction 
from observational statements, then religious statements have no chance 
of being verified unless they are reduced to the description of religious at-
titude: unless we are going to argue that God can be reduced to non-theo-
logical, observational properties, religious statements cannot be logically 
deduced from observational statements. 
We can distinguish two main approaches to religious language among 
the members of the Vienna Circle: either they took religious language to 
be non-cognitive and purely emotive,3 or they took it to be cognitively 
meaningful by trying to reduce it to observational language, to the descrip-
tion of religious attitude.4
No logical positivist gave a clear account of how to understand this al-
leged emotive meaning of religious belief. Some years later, Braithwaite in 
his “An Empiricist View of the Nature of Religious Belief ”5 offered a more 
developed emotivistic account of religious belief, according to which it is 
some sort of commitment to a concrete way of life. On the other hand, this 
reduction of religious language to the description of religious attitude is 
well summarized by Neurath’s claim that
There are Protestants, but there is no Protestantism. Physicalistical-
ly speaking, one can only note that men who have a certain mode of 
New Movement in European Philosophy”, The Journal of Philosophy 28/11, 281-296; R. 
Carnap (1931). “Psychology in Physical Language”, 166 [reprinted in: A. J. Ayer. Lo-
gical Positivism, 165-198]; M. Schlick (1932/1933). “Positivism and Realism”, 86-88 
[reprinted in: A. J. Ayer, Logical Positivism., 82-107].
3  See, for example: R (1928). The Logical Structure of the World, 293 [reprinted in: R. 
Carnap. The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, 1-304].
4  See, for example: O. Neurath (1931). “Empirical Sociology: The Scientific Con-
tent of History and Political Economy”, 358 [reprinted in: O Neurath (1973). Empir-
icism and Sociology. Boston: D. Reidel Pulishing Company, 319-421].
5  R. B. Braithwaite (1955). “An Empiricist View of the Nature of Religious Be-
lief ” (1955) [reprinted in: B. Mitchell (ed.) (1971). The Philosophy of Religion. Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 72-91].
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life and use certain words in cults (and otherwise) begin at a certain 
point in time to exhibit a different behavior and perhaps to use different 
words.6 
The problem is that neither of these two conceptions succeeds in cap-
turing what orthodox theism takes religious belief to be. In the ordinary 
understanding of religion, the evaluative aspect of believing is, so to say, 
interwoven with the factual claims of religious discourse. One cannot, for 
example, consider himself a Christian without also claiming Jesus’ Resur-
rection, which is a factual claim. Perhaps orthodox theism has an inade-
quate conception of religious language, but if this is so, these approaches 
must be understood as proposals for correcting our ordinary understanding 
of religion. 
It is true that if we accept the verifiability principle in its Viennese for-
mulation, then we are forced to adopt one of these two conceptions to 
account for religious language. Strictly speaking, however, the success of 
neither of these two positions is linked to the success of the verifiability 
principle: we can, for example, defend an emotivistic account of religious 
belief on other grounds, without accepting the verifiability principle. 
The verifiability principle, however, suffers from some severe limita-
tions, which make it clearly inadequate as a criterion for cognitive mean-
ing. These problems are already well known. To begin with, the verifiability 
principle has the odd consequence that universal statements, statements 
of the form ‘All A’s are P’ are not cognitively significant since they cannot 
be logically deduced from any finite set of observational statements. It also 
runs into problems when accounting for dispositional properties, proper-
ties such as ‘soluble’ or ‘fragile’: since an object might have these properties 
even if it never manifests them, it is not clear how these properties can 
be reduced to observational language. For similar reasons, the verifiability 
principle ran into difficulties when accounting for theoretical entities re-
ferred to in scientific discourse. Furthermore, since relations of modality 
cannot be logically deduced from observational statements, the verifiabil-
ity principle failed to distinguish between ordinary universal statements 
(i.e., statements of the form ‘All A’s are contingently P’) and statements 
expressing natural laws (i.e., statements of the form ‘All A’s are [empirical-
6  O. Neurath. “Empirical sociology: The Scientific Content of History and Political 
Economy”, 358. 
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ly] necessarily P’). A last problem of the verifiability principle concerns its 
status: since the verifiability principle is neither an analytical claim nor a 
verifiable statement, it seems that we must accept that the verifiability prin-
ciple is a metaphysical, cognitively meaningless claim. 
By the mid 30’s some logical positivists became aware of the severity of 
these problems and realized of the need of revising the verifiability princi-
ple: Carnap, for example, claimed that the principle must be abandoned 
since “[...] it led to a too narrow restriction of scientific language, excluding 
not only metaphysical sentences but also certain scientific sentences having 
factual meaning”.7  To resolve these problems, logical positivists gave up the 
requirement of conclusive verifiability, i.e., logical deducibility from obser-
vational statements, and defended a sort of liberalisation of the verifiability 
principle. The most serious attempt of which was Carnap’s confirmability 
criterion, first defended in his “Testability and Meaning”.8
In contrast to the Viennese formulation of the verifiability principle, the 
confirmability criterion is understood as an inductive inference from ob-
servational statements.9 A statement is not completely verified but is con-
firmed to some degree upon the single instances, and the possibility of being 
confirmed to some degree is what assures that the statement is cognitively 
meaningful.10
More concretely, a statement is confirmed when it allows us to make 
successful and observable predictions.11 This not only seems to preserve the 
7  R. Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3/4, 421. See 
also: A. J Ayer (1959). “Editor’s Introduction”, in A. J. Ayer. Logical Positivism, 13-14; 
A. C Ewing (1937). “Meaninglessness”, Mind 46/183, 348; H. Reichenbach (1938). 
Experience and Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 188; F. Will (1940). “Verifiability and the 
External World”, Philosophy of Science 7/2, 185.
8  R Carnap. “Testability and Meaning”; R. Carnap (1937). “Testability and Mean-
ing – Continued”, Philosophy of Science 4/1, 1-40. Although in this paper I will focus 
on Carnap’s confirmability criterion, it is important to point out that other different at-
tempts to revise the verifiability principle were made. John Hick, for example, aimed to 
liberalize the verifiability principle by claiming that verifiability was, at least partially, a 
psychological notion (see: J. Hick (1960). “Theology and Verification”, 54-55 [reprinted 
in: B. Mitchell. The Philosophy of Religion, 53-71]).
9  Carnap’s efforts for trying to show that inductive inference is a procedure as logical 
as logical deduction respond to this claim (see: R. Carnap (1945). “On Inductive Log-
ic”, Philosophy of Science 12/2, 72-97; R. Carnap (1946). “Remarks on Induction and 
Truth”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6/4, 590-602 (especially 590-596)). 
10  R. Carnap. “Testability and Meaning”, especially 420-428. 
11  R. Carnap (1939). “Foundations of Logic and Mathematics”. International Ency-
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link between meaning and experience, but at the same time it seems to 
respect the meaningfulness of theoretical entities and dispositional terms: 
even if we cannot reduce them to observational language, we understand 
their meaning provided they are linked to sensory-experience through 
their observable effects. 
So, in the end, Carnap’s confirmability criterion turns out to be a sort 
of abductive argument: the best explanation for predictive success is the 
reference of the theoretical entities employed in the derivation of the pre-
diction. We can now clearly see the extent to which the criterion had been 
liberalised: remember that in the Viennese formulation of the verifiability 
principle the only procedure allowed was logical deductibility from obser-
vational statements.
Once abductive reasoning is allowed and the requirement of reducing 
all cognitively meaningful statements to the observational is abandoned, 
the door opens to arguing for the meaningfulness of religious language. 
Most (if not all) arguments from natural theology are formulated in this 
way: they claim to show the existence of God through our observational 
statements. The so-called ‘argument from miracles’, for example, is con-
strued along these lines: once there is an event which is outside the scope 
of scientific explicability (i.e., a violation of a natural law), the best explana-
tion for it is that that event has a supernatural cause.
These arguments, of course, might fail and the theistic hypothesis might 
not, after all, be confirmed. The argument from miracles, for example, 
might be contested by arguing that the possibility of a violation of a natu-
ral law is internally inconsistent or by arguing that the theistic explanation 
lacks enough explanatory power to be the best explanation of an event. But 
whether these kinds of arguments succeed in showing the existence of God 
is not something that can be decided beforehand; they must be assessed 
argument by argument. 
Notice also that the theist would gladly accept that our knowledge of 
God comes from His observable effects -so, the theist also accepts this link 
between meaning and experience upon which Carnap’s confirmability is 
built. The key question is, of course, whether the theist is justified in claim-
clopedia of Unified Science 1/3, 67-69; R. Carnap (1956). “The Methodological Cha-
racter of Theoretical Concepts”, 49-52, in H. Feigl and M. Scriven (eds.) (1956). 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Volume I: The Foundations of Science and 
the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 38-76. 
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ing that God has observable effects. But whether there are such effects or 
not is not implied by the acceptance of Carnap’s confirmability as a criteri-
on for cognitive meaning.
It might be contested that theoretical entities are confirmable in so far as 
it is assumed that they are natural entities: we are justified in claiming that 
theoretical entities bear some relation to the observable because theoretical 
entities are of the same nature as observational entities -which is the idea be-
hind Reichenbach’s so-called ‘extension rules’.12 So, it might be argued that 
religious statements cannot be confirmed, since they involve non-natural 
entities. This argument by itself, however, is simply begging the question in 
favour of naturalism, since it assumes that there are only natural causes. But 
this is simply to deny the core claim of theism (i.e., that there are observ-
able effects supernaturally caused): by assuming that there are only natural 
causes, one is acting as if he has already beforehand solved the matter of the 
existence of God. Of course, if we happen to have independent evidence for 
naturalism, the theistic hypothesis cannot satisfy Carnap’s confirmability 
principle, but the point I am making here is that the confirmability criterion 
neither requires, nor presupposes, the truth of naturalism. 
Conclusion
The verifiability principle in its classical Viennese formulation, which 
states that verifiability is a relation of logical deductibility from observa-
tional statements, implies that religious language is not verifiable -and, 
hence, cognitively meaningless. If we are to account for religious language, 
then, we must adopt an emotivistic approach or reduce it to the description 
of religious attitude. 
Yet the verifiability principle in its classical, Viennese formulation fails. 
So, to account for religious language, we are not forced to adopt an emotiv-
ist conception of it or to reduce it to the description of religious attitude: 
if either of these two conceptions must be defended, it must be defended 
on other grounds. 
Carnap’s confirmability, which is a liberalised form of the verifiability 
principle, does not, by itself, imply the claim that religious language is cog-
12  H. Reichenbach (1951). “The Verifiability Theory of Meaning”, 100 [reprinted 
in: H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds.) (1953). Readings in the Philosophy of Science. 
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 93-102].
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nitively meaningless. A theist can adopt Carnap’s confirmability and still 
argue that religious language is cognitively meaningful. The point is that 
whether religious language is confirmable or not (and, hence, whether it 
is cognitively meaningful or not) depends on the debate about naturalism 
(i.e., the thesis that there are only natural causes) and supernaturalism (i.e., 
the thesis that there are observable effects supernaturally caused), not on 
the acceptance of confirmability as a criterion for cognitive meaning since, 
from a theist perspective, the existence of God can be confirmed through 
our observational statements. If we had independent evidence for natural-
ism, then religious language would turn out to be meaningless; the con-
firmability principle by itself, however, neither requires nor presupposes 
the truth of naturalism.
Finally, a last remark is needed. I am aware that nowadays no one accepts 
the Viennese formulation of the verifiability principle, and that almost no-
body takes Carnap’s confirmability criterion (at least in the original terms 
that Carnap defended it) to be an adequate criterion for cognitive meaning. 
However, I also think that the historical relevance that Logical Positivism 
had during the first half of the 20th century for the posterior development 
of analytic philosophy of religion is something beyond dispute. The origin 
of some questions that are currently discussed in contemporary analytic 
philosophy of religion can be traced back to the debate about the mean-
ingfulness of religious language that has been addressed here (take, for ex-
ample, the question about the predictive and explanatory power of theistic 
explanations). So, even under the assumption that religious language does 
not need to be verifiable or confirmable in order to be meaningful, I think 
that to offer a clear exposition of that debate is still relevant in so far as it 
can help us to reach a better comprehension of those contemporary discus-
sions. 
Alberto Oya 
Universitat de Girona 
alberto.oya@udg.edu
